Formal Models of Arms Races

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ISBN 100866820019
ISBN 139780866820011

The best known model of an arms race is the descriptive model of Richardson.1 The model is the two linear differential equations Ma = a, Mb - a2MA + a3 (a,a2 > 0) (1) Mb = b,MA - b2MB + b3. Richardson's model of arms races: Description, critique, and an alternative model. International Studies Quarterly 63 – Google ScholarCited by: VOL.

2, NO. 1 FORMAL MODELS OF ARMS RACES 91 their hard work in wrenching every policy implication from their model, even the most inspired of linear models cannot adequately replace models that more faithfully simulate the expected physical phenomena of a nuclear missile.

"The Arms Race and Military Keynesianism," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 11(1), pagesMarch. Cheng-Te Lee, "A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol.

3(2), pagesJuly. Corrections. All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.

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You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:vyipSee general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title. One is as a two-person game, in particular the Prisoner’s dilemma, where the choices are to arm or not to arm, and the dominant strategy, for both to arm, is not Pareto optimal.

The other, which is the focus of this chapter, is the Richardson model of the arms race as an action-reaction process, represented by a pair of differential : Ron P. Smith. Wiberg, H å kan () Arms races, formal models and quantitative tests.

2 in: Nils Petter This chapter considers Richardson’s classic arms race model and his book Arms and Insecurity. of formal models of arms races, the models we have in the literature lack one or more these features – no choices (Richardson models), no option to use the weapons (Prisoners’ Dilemma models), or no accumulation of arms over multiple periods (PowellJackson and Morelli ).

In a Markov. was a system of differential equations modelling arms races. This system has become known as the Richardson Arms Race Model, and has been subject to analysis and refinement since being published. The basic system is: dx dt = ay −mx+r dy dt = bx−ny +s This system can be expanded to include any number of equations, each one representing a single by: 1.

Implementation of Richardson’s arms race model tion dA bq(t) kA, dt where b is the constant that describes the effectiveness of advertising and k the constant that corresponds to the depreciation of the product (Little, ). The structure of the N-A model is close enough to the equations of the system (1).Cited by: 6.

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): I consider a model of arming in which states choose in successive periods whether to build weapons and whether to attack, and in which arms accumulate across periods.

Surprisingly, despite a long history of formal models of arms races, the models we have in the literature lack one or more these features – no choices. The relationships between an arms race and the outbreak of war have been debated over many years. Indeed, the question of war outbreak is the most basic and fundamental one in any study of arms races.

This question obviously carries much more urgency when it becomes that of whether a nuclear arms race might lead to a nuclear war. That is the Cited by: “ Teaching Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Economics,” Journal of Economic Education 21 (2): – Anderton, Charles H.

“ A New Look at the Relationship Among Arms Races, Disarmament, and the Probability of War,” in Chatterji, Manas and Rennie Forcey, Linda (eds.), Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of. Mathematical Social Sciences 15 () North-Holland NOTE TESTING FOR CAUSALITY IN THE RICHARDSON ARMS RACE MODEL De-piao TANG Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia, MOU.S.A.

David C.H. YANG College of Business Administration, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HIU.S.A. Communicated by M. Beckmann Received 28 March Cited by: 1. The Richardson arms race model: Applications of first order differential equations to international relations (UMAP modules in undergraduate mathematics Author: Dina A Zinnes.

the fieldnote in [3 ], “The Richardson arms race model constitutes one of the most impor-tant models of arms race phenomena and, at the same time, one of the most influentia formal models in all of the international relations literature.” Arms races are not limited to File Size: KB.

ISBN: OCLC Number: Description: vi, pages ; 24 cm: Contents: PART ONE: THE STATE OF THE ARTResearch on Arms Races - Nils Petter GleditschArms Race Dynamics and Arms Control - Dieter SenghaasArms Races, Formal Models, and Quantitative Tests - Hakan WibergArms Race Modelling - Michael D Intriligator.

Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective Andrew Kydd. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. (Apr, ), pp. A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War James D.

Morrow. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. (Sep, ), pp. The possible relationships of an arms race to the outbreak of war are treated in the framework of a dynamic model of a missile war that could be used by defense planners to simulate the outbreak.

States interested in reducing the level of arms competition with a rival can employ a variety of strategies designed to promote cooperation. We examine the ability of three important strategies—unilateral action, tacit bargaining, and negotiation—to reduce the intensity of arms races motivated by different patterns of preferences and complicated by different sources of by: Demonstrating the ways in which work in a broad range of fields can be pulled together in the analysis of conflict, this book provides the reader with a general introduction to the principles of conflict analysis and lays a methodological foundation for the further development of the interdisciplinary field of peace science.

The text begins with an extensive survey of arms race models, from. Arms races as exemplified by the accumulation of stocks of weapons represent a very special case of weapons as an instrument of power.

We have argued that arms races in the twenty-first century will be very different from the Cold War arms race. One of the things that is different about arms races now is the presence of increasing returns in theFile Size: 22KB. The parameter is a A Dynamic Heuristic Game Theory Model Arms Race 79 the degree of superiority desired.

For example, if = then A seeks to have 10 per cent more missiles than B.». Planning and Revisions in Plans Planning refers to the elaboration of a set of decisions over or planner^.Cited by: 2.

Arms race models There is an extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature on arms race modeling. These include game-theoretic models based on the “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD), dynamic mathematical models based on the Richardson model, and economic models frequently based on a “utility-maximizing” framework.

arms race and the failure of deterrence leads to war. Formal Explanations of Arms Races A common game theoretic modeling approach of arms races is the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. The RPD model is related to first International Relations argument by Jervis where an anarchic.

This book, first published ingives a critical account of formal international relations theory. That formal and mathematical methods can be applied to the study of international relations is often regarded with surprise, but the author demonstrates not only how these methods give insights into problems such as deterrence or arms races but also that the increase in the power of.

ISBN: OCLC Number: Description: vi, pages ; 24 cm: Contents: Preface / Sverre Lodgaard --Research on arms races / Nils Petter Gleditsch --Arms race dynamics and arms control / Dieter Senghaas --Arms races, formal models, and quantitative tests / Håkan Wiberg --Arms race modeling: a reconsideration / Michael D.

Longer arms races tend to have a stabilizing influence on international politics; quantitative arms races are more likely to result in war than qualitative ones. Essential reading for arms-races scholars of any level. Isard, Walter. Arms Races, Arms Control, and Conflict Analysis: Contributions from Peace Science and Peace Economics.

New York. The theory of dynamical systems-especially in the form of discrete maps and automata-makes it very easy to convert conceptual ideas of arms races or other forms of social interactions into formal, dynamical models.

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Modern interfaces and interpreters also allow a quick, interactive parameter search and display of attractors or other long term : G. Mayer-Kress. Lewis Fry Richardson, FRS (11 October – 30 September ) was an English mathematician, physicist, meteorologist, psychologist and pacifist who pioneered modern mathematical techniques of weather forecasting, and the application of similar techniques to studying the causes of wars and how to prevent them.

He is also noted for his pioneering work concerning fractals and a method for Awards: Fellow of the Royal Society. An arms race, such as the U.S.-Soviet Cold War nuclear arms race, occurs when countries increase their military forces to gain superiority over one another. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Google Scholar. Gray, C.

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S () “Arms races and their influence upon international stability with specific reference to the Middle East,” in G. Sheffer (ed.) Dynamics of a Conflict. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Google by: A new set of model equations is proposed to describe the evolution of the arms race, by extending Richardson’s model with special emphases that (1) power dependent defensive reaction or historical enmity could be a motive force to promote armaments, (2) a deterrent would suppress the growth of armaments, and (3) the defense reaction of one nation against the other nation depends nonlinearly Author: Masaki Tomochi, Mitsuo Kono.